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ABSTRACT This paper proposes a solution for low-cost consumer IoT devices to employ end-to-end
security without requiring additional hardware. Manufacturers of consumer IoT devices often sacrifice
security in favour of features, user-friendliness, time to market or cost, in order to stay ahead of their
competitors. However, this is unwise, as demonstrated by recent hacks on consumer IoT devices. Low-cost
embedded devices struggle to create suitable entropy for key generation; on the other hand, smartphones are
both abundant and have multiple sources of entropy for strong key generation. The proposed architecture
takes advantage of these properties and offloads key generation and transfer to the user’s smartphone,
removing the need for constrained IoT devices to perform public key infrastructure and generate symmetric
keys. The authors implemented the design on a $1 general-purpose microcontroller and then analysed the
performance. The design allows all communication to and from the device to be encryptedwhile being simple
to setup, low-cost and responsive without any additional manufacturing cost. The architecture presents a
general solution, which could be implemented on anymicrocontroller. Since the architecture does not require
any additional hardware, it can be retroactively applied to deployed devices through a firmware update.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, security, encryption, wireless communication, microcontrollers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in consumer behaviour have driven an
increase in the market for Home Automation devices. These
devices promise to make our lives more convenient and auto-
mated. For example, lights can be turned on and off using a
voice assistant, a smartphone, or through automatic triggers
such as when approaching the home. Although automated
systems have been available for many years, as technol-
ogy has improved, and the cost of devices and difficulty of
installation has decreased, consumer Internet of Things (IoT)
devices have seen a rapid increase in demand, particularly in
a domestic setting [1]. However, this convenience and low-
cost comes with a risk. There have been numerous recent
instances of domestic internet-connected devices being com-
promised [2]–[5]. However, as the domestic consumer market
is price sensitive, this introduces a challenge to make the
devices secure. Implementing security features could lead to
higher costs for manufactures [6]. This paper will focus on
domestic low-cost Wi-Fi IoT devices and explore approaches
which can be taken to introduce robust security.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Ana Lucila Sandoval Orozco.
II. BACKGROUND
A. MARKET CONSTRAINTS
As the market for Internet of Things (IoT) devices has been
steady growing, a recent UK Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology report [7], listed economic drivers as one
of the main reasons for poor cyber security for consumer
devices. The EU Agency for Cybersecurity, academics, and
industry have all expressed concerns that manufacturers
prioritise cost, user experience and time to market over
security [8]–[12]. Moreover, a 2017 survey found that 42%
manufacturers’ consumers were not willing to pay for secu-
rity, and the next largest section at 28% only willing to pay
a 1-10% premium [13]. This means that security must be
provided at no additional hardware cost.
B. SECURITY
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), uses one shared key
to quickly and efficiently encrypt and decrypt data, even
on low-cost devices [14], [15]. This can be achieved using
either a purely software or hardware accelerated version. The
main shortfall for this type of cryptography is the require-
ment to have the same key on both end devices, leading
to the challenge of sharing the key securely between the
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devices [16]. The conventional way to overcome this problem
is by employing hybrid encryption. Public key encryption is
used to set up a secure channel, which is used to transfer the
shared symmetric key [17], [18]. This approach works well
in high-performance computing devices such as smartphones
but does not scale downwell to low-cost embedded hardware.
C. SECURITY NECESSITY
Consumer IoT devices can be separated into two categories:
devices which can natively support security and devices
which require additional hardware to communicate securely.
The former is made up from comparatively high performance
devices, commonly featuring ARM chips and/or the ability
run full operating systems. One such device is the Google
Chromecast, which features anAES hardware accelerator and
a random number generator [19], and so is capable of imple-
menting public key infrastructure and generating a suitably
random systematic key to encrypt future communications.
In the second category, there are much more constrained
devices which are only designed for a single limited purpose,
which achieve their primary functionality using a much lower
performance computing hardware. These lower performance
chips commonly do not feature hardware AES accelerators or
hardware random number generators. Moreover, since these
devices follow a predictable series of events, they struggle
to generate sufficient entropy to create secure keys. One
example of a constrained device is the Belkin Wemo Switch,
which offered customers the ability to remotely turn on and
off any device plugged into a mains socket. Users could
also use their smartphone to check if they had switched off
a particular appliance, trigger their lights to turn on when
arriving home, or programmatically schedule devices to turn
on or off — saving the consumer money and time [20].
Nonetheless, shortly after the product was released, various
exploits were discovered in the device’s architecture resulting
in Belkin’s customers being advised not to use the product
anymore [21]. These exploits were possible because Belkin
had employed password-based encryption to generate the
AES key, where the parameters of key were predictable [22].
D. ENTROPY GENERATION
The security of a communication channel depends on the
unpredictability of the keys used to encrypt that channel;
therefore, suitability random entropy sources are required to
ensure that strong keys are generated. If an attacker could
predict the credentials, even the most sophisticated security
scheme would be compromised by simply guessing the key.
With traditional communication, this is not an issue as mod-
ern computers and smartphones already get entropy from a
variety of diverse sources, which can be combined [23]–[26].
On the other hand, generating suitability robust keys in low-
cost IoT devices is more challenging. These devices com-
monly run a limited set of instructions and have minimal user
interaction [27]. In response, the research community has
investigated various potential solutions to enable constrained
embedded devices to generate suitable entropy.
The LoRaWAN alliance attempted to solve this problem
of single-purpose devices not being suitably complex to
generate entropy by reusing existing hardware. Noting that
these devices would have to have an antenna to send and
receive messages, the antenna was employed as a sensor,
recording the received signal strength [28]. This was assumed
to be suitably random, but researchers have discovered that
by jamming or otherwise influencing the signal strength,
it could become more predictable [29]. This demonstrated
that although existing sensors may be available, and could
provide semi-random data, if the sensor could be influenced,
this would make for a poor entropy source.
Academic researchers did discover several ways for
embedded devices to generate sufficient entropy when
employing additional hardware. Voris et al. [30] investigated
using various individual sensors, including an accelerometer,
magnetometers, proximity sensor, photometers, thermome-
ter, microphone and discovered that each of these would cre-
ate some entropy. However, all were able to be influenced by
external interference, with the exception of the accelerometer.
The researchers went onto discover that any attempts to
reduce the entropy generated by the accelerometer resulted
in the entropy increasing. This would suggest that using
an accelerometer would be a solution to providing entropy
in high constrained devices. Similarly, crypto authentication
coprocessors which feature AES hardware accelerators, and
hardware random number generator, would be able to create
sufficient entropy. Finally, researchers discovered that cer-
tain specific implementations of microcontrollers could take
advantage of their hardware to generate entropy. However,
it is important to note all of these solutions work for particular
cases, but are not a general solution. As devices which did not
already feature these properties, there would be an increase in
the raw material cost of the device.
E. LEGISLATION
Legislation is catching up with the problem. The recent Cali-
fornia Senate Bill No. 327 [31] states that manufacturers must
make a reasonable attempt at cybersecurity before selling a
device in California. While this only directly affects Califor-
nia, manufacturers may apply these changes universally to
avoid maintaining two different versions of a device. On the
other hand, the United Kingdom’s recent Code of Practice for
Consumer IoT Security [32], outlines a number of improve-
ments for IoT security, but is currently only voluntary. Sim-
ilarly, the European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute (ETSI) has also outlined 13 practices that manufacturers
can optionally follow [33]. Regulation 2019/881 also created
the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, where there
remit is to create certification frameworks and governance for
the EU on cyber security matters [34]. However as of the time
of writing, there have been no defined rules. In the United
States the Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act
of 2019 [35], aims to use the purchasing power of the US
federal government to persuade IoT manufactures to improve
their device security. However, this bill is currently only
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making its way through the legislative process, and would
also only be voluntary.
III. ARCHITECTURE
Our solution uses a smartphone to generate keying material
securely, which it then passes to the consumer IoT device,
and also to the IoT device’s server. Smartphones are ubiqui-
tous with 87% of the UK population [36], and 95% of the
target demographic for Smart Homes owning at least one
smartphone [37]. They have powerful processors, multiple
sensors, rich user interaction and run multiple processes and
so are very capable of generating sufficient random data to
provide suitably random keys [26]. Transferring the key to
the IoT device also takes advantage of existing technology,
given that by their nature IoT devices already have an internet
connection.
Google employs a superficially similar setup procedure
with their popular Wi-Fi-based Chromecast devices, where
a smartphone is used in the setup procedure to connect the
IoT device to the domestic Wi-Fi network. This approach has
also been patented for household appliances [38]. However,
Chromecast initiates a TLS connection as it features aMarvell
DE3005-A1 system-on-chip [19], which contains a hardware
random number generator and AES hardware accelerator.
Low-cost, low-powered devices do not feature any of this
additional hardware.
A. SETUP PROCEDURE
The secure initialisation protocol operates as follows:
1) The device is factory provisioned with an (ideally
unique) wifi credential, made available to the user in
the packaging
2) On initial activation, the device sets up a private net-
work using this credential, and the user connects to it
using their smartphone
3) The smartphone seeds random data and generates an
AES key
4) The smartphone shares this key with the IoT device,
along with the credentials for the network the IoT will
use to connect to the Internet
5) The smartphone and IoT device disconnects from the
private network and reconnects to the Internet
6) The smartphone and IoT device establish a secure
connection between each other over the local network
using symmetric encryption with the key the smart-
phone generated and shared
7) The smartphone shares the IoT device’s key securely
with the remote server.
On start-up, the device will broadcast its Wi-Fi access
point, using a default SSID and device-specific password,
inline with the UK’s Code of Practice for Consumer IoT
Security [32]. The passwords will be provisioned into the
devices at the factory and will be optionally supplied inside
the product box in the form of a QR code. An additional
advantage of this approach would be the automatized usage
of 63 character long Wi-Fi passwords while removing the
potential for human error during input.
Interception of the package en route to the user is possi-
ble, where a malicious actor opens the package and records
the supplied QR code to intercept the transmission of the
AES key during device setup, and therefore compromises
the device. However, several additional steps can be taken to
mitigate these risks.
1) The Wi-Fi transmit power of the IoT device can be
turned down to its lowest power, 0.25 dBm in the case
of the ESP8266, so that the signal disappears into the
noise floor when attempting to detect at a distance
greater than 20 cm away. The Wi-Fi adaptive power
control of Android phones will cause the corresponding
smartphone transmit power to decrease accordingly
2) Configuring the Wi-Fi module to support a single con-
nection; therefore, only a malicious attacker or a legit-
imate user can be on the temporary Wi-Fi at any one
time.
3) sealing the QR code in a tamper-evident envelope
Additionally, the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi band is highly con-
gested [39], and, therefore, it would be challenging to detect
the correct signal through a malicious attacker waiting out-
side the property. Furthermore, the temporary Wi-Fi network
would only be configured to broadcast for approximately one
minute, which would be less than the typical time for a button
press Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS).
An accompanying app downloaded from an application
marketplace, e.g. the Google Play Store, which would gener-
ate an AES key, and automate the connection to the private
network. Initiating this process, the user would scan the
QR code, the app would extract the credentials and switch
the smartphone’s Wi-Fi from the home network to the IoT
device’s generated network. The smartphone would then gen-
erate an AES key and transfer it to the IoT device. The
user would then be prompted for any specific information,
e.g. a personalised device identifier and the domestic Wi-Fi
credentials for the IoT device to join the network.
After the key is shared, both devices (re)join the domestic
network. Once the IoT device and the smartphone can see
each other on the network, the joining process will be con-
sidered successful. Finally, the smartphone will take the user
through the optional stage, linking the device to an external
server, for out of the house control. The smartphone will
transfer the shared key by setting up an SSL/TLS connection
to the server to securely transfer the AES key. The phone,
the switch and server should now be able to contact each other
and encrypt/decrypt all messages. As illustrated in Figure 1,
the proposed architecture is based on a local interaction, with
keys then being sent to a remote location, rather than trying
to provision a unique key from a remote location. This would
provide the following advantages:
• If a user does not wish to control their device from out-
side their home, no external communication is required.
• If the manufacturer’s servers were down or decom-
missioned, the product would continue to operate,
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FIGURE 1. Setup Architecture.
whereas similar devices have previously lost functional-
ity in these situations. In all these instances the device
could default to running locally and still be locally
functional.
• There is no requirement on the product manufacturer to
generate and manage the distribution of keys.
• By transferring the key over a short term private net-
work, a compromised device on the domestic network
could not overhear the key. Transferring the key after the
device had joined the domestic network would allow an
interception.
• The entry of high entropy keys into the IoT device is
greatly simplified for the user
B. INTERNAL USER COMMUNICATION
The mobile application achieves internal communication
without a centralised hub by monitoring the network.
On detection of a new switch, themobile application alerts the
user to its presence, prompting them to start the installation
process. If any switches have lost their previously assigned
address, periodic searches would also find and record any
change in the IP address. The downside to this approach is
that any malicious device on the network could detect the
IoT device’s presence through its fingerprint. However, con-
sidering the device could be detected through several other
techniques [40]–[42], it was reasoned that this would make a
minimal difference, considering all communication would be
encrypted.
C. EXTERNAL USER COMMUNICATION
Communication with the IoT device when on separate net-
works is managed via an API endpoint. An authorised trigger,
the user’s phone, a voice assistant, such as Google Home,
Alexa, Siri, or automation apps, such as IFTTT, tasker, zapier,
can all connect to the manufacturer’s server to post an HTTP
request to the relevant endpoint, and update the state of the
device. The IoT device will then periodically poll the central
server and update accordingly.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
This purposed architecture has been implemented, cre-
ating an IoT smart light switch, constructed using an
MSP430G2553 microcontroller and an ESP8266 Wi-Fi chip.
The Smart Switch can be controlled both from physical
buttons on the light switch and through an Android appli-
cation. The app works locally on the local network, and
remotely via a centralised server. Linking with a centralised
server also allows the switch to be part of a more extensive
system. For example, an IFTTT recipe was also set up in
conjunction with a Google Home assistant, so that the light
could be controlled via voice.
A. DEVICE SETUP
As described in section III-A the setup of the Smart Switch
is done by wiring the switch in and then joining the private
Wi-Fi network it creates to transfer the AES key generated on
the Android phone. The app can also to be used to personalise
details such as a name for the light, so the user knows which
light they are modifying in the app, e.g. master bedroom.
Once this has completed, the user can decide if they want to
authorise external connections. If they agree, the app makes a
secure connection to the central server to transfer the details
of the light and associated AES key to the user’s remote
account.
B. INTERNAL COMMUNICATION
Given that the system was designed to operate without an
external server or local hub, the Android phone uses mDNS
to detect devices advertising themselves as Smart Switches
and will encrypt the message using the associated AES key.
The receiving switch confirms the message authenticity by
checking the HMAC, before decoding and acting on the
payload.
C. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION
Any time there is a brightness change, either by the app
or physical change in the light switch, the device sends an
HTTP Post request to the server updating the status of the
light held remotely. Once the user opens the mobile appli-
cation, an HTTP request is issued to adjust the display to
reflect the exact brightness. On a change of state request,
a request is made to the server updating the state. The smart
switch device will poll the server every 30 seconds, and
if a dispute is detected, the physical buttons override the
server status.
D. ENCRYPTION
Predictable messages, such as on and off, could infer occu-
pancy of the home by analysing the pattern.Moreover, if these
messages remained the same each time, it would be possi-
ble to record the messages for a replay attack. Therefore,
it was decided to implement AES counter mode on the
server, Android app&Smart Switch, obscuring themessages,
and by implementing counters similar to those stipulated in
the LoRaWAN specification preventing replay attacks [28].
To protect against bit-flipping attacks a message authentica-
tion code (MAC) was also calculated, by each device and
included in the sent message. The receiving device checks
the MAC before decryption the payload.
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TABLE 1. Software encryption operation.
V. RESULTS
Although the smart switch implementation was made as
a proof of concept, the proposed architecture would suit
any low-cost IoT device. With this in mind the time and
energy requirements of the systemweremeasured for running
an AES128 software implementation on an MSP430G2553.
During testing, it was discovered that the measurement
equipment was not accurate enough to measure a single
encryption/decryption operation. Therefore, it was decided to
execute the process 50,000 times and extrapolate for what
would be the requirements for a single operation of each
encryption and decryption. It was also decided to vary the
clock rate of the MSP430G2553 chip to compare the time
and energy consumed. This data is shown for encryption
in table 1 which took 15,725 cycles to complete a single AES
encryption operation.
The software implementation for decryption was also pro-
filed. Although it was found to require 23,470 cycles - an
increase over the encryption algorithm. The testing showed
that both AES128 encryption and decryption were viable
for greater than 25 ms response times. This is notably less
than the average of 250ms human response time [43]. The
timings and energy consumption are detailed in table 2. The
authors note that although the power consumption was lower
at lower clock frequencies, the increased time requirements
of the 1 MHz clock operation results in using the highest
total consumption. Therefore, depending on the application,
it may be more beneficial to operate at the highest power
consumption — 16MHz—, and then enable one of the built-
in low-power modes. On the other hand, if the system is
designed to be continually running without any low-power
modes enabled, it would save power by running at 1MHz.
A table detailing the power consumption at different clock
speeds at a fixed interval of 10 seconds, along with the
consumption of low-power mode 3 in table 3.
As outlined above, three of the issues securing low-cost IoT
devices are; key generation, setting up public-key encryption
and remaining responsive. Offloading the generation to a
smartphone solves the first issue. Using the same smart-
phone to transfer the key solves the second issue. Finally,
by demonstrating that encryption and decryption are achiev-
able on an MSP430G2553 in a reasonable time, the proposed
architecture solves all of the outlined problems, enabling a
$1 microcontroller to use AES128.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The proposed architecture works well for a single user or
multiple users sharing the same set of keys. However, if each
TABLE 2. Software decryption operation.
TABLE 3. Power consumption at different clock speeds.
user required dedicated keys, for example to provide zonal
control over the lights. Each user would have to repeat the
setup process for each light, they are allowed to control,
a time-intensive task. The simple solution to this would be to
have each new user detect all the switches they can see on the
network throughmDNS, and generate a new key for each one.
However, since these keys would then be transferred over the
home Wi-Fi network, if this were compromised, then each of
these keys would also be compromised. A more sophisticated
solution would involve creating a master user. The master
user would create master AES keys, whowould initially setup
up all the devices. Once control is to be delegated to an
new individual sub-keys would be generated and transferred
to each of the required switches encrypted with the master
key. The master user would then separately send each sub-
key to the user’s phone using Bluetooth or NFC. However,
storing further keys in these constrained would require more
resources, and would be more complex for users, therefore
it would be the vendors decision how to proceed in their
specific case.
The proposed architecture was tailored to Wi-Fi devices
because the majority of the domestic IoT device market use
Wi-Fi. Despite this, a similar idea could be applied to wear-
able devices, which predominantly use Bluetooth to connect
to a smartphone. Furthermore, by modifying the design to
relay data via a local intermediary, such as a hub, additional
communication interfaces not commonly found on smart-
phones could also be used. For example, Philips Hue usesWi-
Fi to communicate with a hub, and then Zigbee to the bulb.
The hub acting as a relay for the phone generated key would
allow each Phillips Hue lightbulb to end-to-end encrypt its
traffic. Further work could be undertaken to implement this
modification.
VII. CONCLUSION
The created architecture allows low-cost IoT devices to have
suitably random keys without additional dedicated hard-
ware. By offloading key generation and transfer to the user’s
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smartphone, there is no requirement for additional compo-
nents to generate entropy. Furthermore, by offloading key
transfer, powerful processors, which would mostly sit idle,
are not required for secure public-key encryption. The paper
also detailed the power and timing requirements of such a
system. We have shown that with our scheme there would be
less than 25 ms delay in responsiveness due to the encryp-
tion overhead. The architecture also provides a user-friendly
way of setting up the device securely, and combined with
recent legislation on IoT device security, demonstrates this
architecture would be beneficial. Specifically, the architec-
ture allows for end-to-end encryption in low-cost IoT devices,
protecting from ‘man in the middle’ attacks, UPnP vulnera-
bilities, andmalicious devices on the same network. Applying
this architecture to the Belkin Wemo Switch would have
prevented these devices being exploited in the way detailed
above. Moreover, as the architecture requires no additional
hardware, it could be deployed to existing devices through
a firmware update. Finally, as the architecture is platform-
agnostic, it could be deployed for any backend web server,
and with a small modification to other forms of IoT devices
without Wi-Fi connectivity.
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